Incumbency Bias: Why Political Office is a Blessing and a Curse in Latin America, by Luis Schiumerini, challenges the prevailing assumption that holding office always confers electoral advantage. Luis Schiumerini introduces a unified theory arguing that institutional contexts shape whether incumbency becomes a blessing or a curse by aligning—or misaligning—citizens’ expectations with officeholders’ capacity to deliver. Through comparative fieldwork and experimental and observational evidence across Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, Luis Schiumerini shows that democracy can create uneven electoral terrains when voters demand good governance but lack sufficient information.

Focusing on Latin America, Luis Schiumerini demonstrates that incumbency advantage is not universal—sometimes incumbents are penalized for not meeting heightened expectations. His work reveals how democratic systems, rather than corrupt elites, can skew electoral fairness when voters expect more than what officeholders can realistically deliver. Luis Schiumerini provides broader global insights into the electoral consequences of holding office, offering a nuanced framework for understanding incumbency dynamics beyond the region¹.