

The background of the cover is a photograph of a woman's silhouette from behind, looking at a display of various sunglasses on shelves. The shelves are arranged in a grid, with four shelves visible. Each shelf has four pairs of sunglasses. The sunglasses have different colors and styles, including aviators, round frames, and rectangular frames. The colors of the lenses include yellow, orange, green, blue, and brown. The woman's hair is dark and shoulder-length. The overall lighting is bright, highlighting the sunglasses against the white background.

# INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS

NINTH EDITION

HAL R. VARIAN

# **Intermediate Microeconomics**

**A Modern Approach**

**Ninth Edition**



# Intermediate Microeconomics

**A Modern Approach**

**Ninth Edition**

**Hal R. Varian**

University of California at Berkeley



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To Carol



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# PREFACE

The success of the first eight editions of *Intermediate Microeconomics* has pleased me very much. It has confirmed my belief that the market would welcome an analytic approach to microeconomics at the undergraduate level.

My aim in writing the original text was to present a treatment of the methods of microeconomics that would allow students to apply these tools on their own and not just passively absorb the predigested cases described in the text. I have found that the best way to do this is to emphasize the fundamental conceptual foundations of microeconomics and to provide concrete examples of their application rather than to attempt to provide an encyclopedia of terminology and anecdote.

A challenge in pursuing this approach arises from the lack of mathematical prerequisites for economics courses at many colleges and universities. The lack of calculus and problem-solving experience in general makes it difficult to present some of the analytical methods of economics. However, it is not impossible. One can go a long way with a few simple facts about linear demand and supply functions, and some elementary algebra. It is perfectly possible to be analytical without being excessively mathematical.

The distinction is worth emphasizing. An analytical approach to economics is one that uses rigorous, logical reasoning. This does not necessarily require the use of advanced mathematical methods. The language of mathematics certainly helps to ensure a rigorous analysis and using it is undoubtedly the best way to proceed when possible, but it may not be appropriate for all students.